Clayton
a few days later told me to return to Arabia and Feisal. This being much
against my grain I urged my complete unfitness for the job: said I hated
responsibility – obviously the position of a conscientious adviser would
be responsible – and that in all my life objects had been gladder to me
than persons, and ideas than objects. So the duty of succeeding with
men, of disposing them to any purpose, would be doubly hard to me. They
were not my medium: I was not practised in that technique. I was unlike
a soldier: hated soldiering. Of course, I had read the usual books (too
many books), Clausewitz and Jomini, Mahan and Foch, had played at
Napoleon's campaigns, worked at Hannibal's tactics, and the wars of
Belisarius, like any other man at Oxford; but I had never thought myself
into the mind of a real commander compelled to fight a campaign of his
own.
Last of all I reminded Clayton, relevantly, that
the Sirdar had telegraphed to London for certain regular officers
competent to direct the Arab war. The reply was that they might be
months arriving, and meanwhile Feisal must be linked to us, and his
needs promptly notified to Egypt. So I had to go; leaving to others the
Arab Bulletin I had founded, the maps I wished to draw, and the file of
the war-changes of the Turkish Army, all fascinating activities in which
my training helped me; to take up a role for which I felt no
inclination. As our revolt succeeded, onlookers have praised its
leadership: but behind the scenes lay all the vices of amateur control,
experimental councils, divisions, whimsicality.
My journey was to Yenbo, now the special base of
Feisal's army, where Garland single-handed was teaching the Sherifians
how to blow up railways with dynamite, and how to keep army stores in
systematic order. The first activity was the better. Garland was an
enquirer in physics, and had years of practical knowledge of explosives.
He had his own devices for mining trains and felling telegraphs and
cutting metals; and his knowledge of Arabic and freedom from the
theories of the ordinary sapper-school enabled him to teach the art of
demolition to unlettered Beduin in a quick and ready way. His pupils
admired a man who was never at a loss.
Incidentally he taught me to be familiar with high
explosive. Sappers
handled it like a sacrament, but Garland would shovel a handful of
detonators into his pocket, with a string of primers, fuse, and fusees,
and jump gaily on his camel for a week's ride to the Hejaz Railway. His
health was poor and the climate made him regularly ill. A weak heart
troubled him after any strenuous effort or crisis; but he treated these
troubles as freely as he did detonators, and persisted till he had
derailed the first train and broken the first culvert in Arabia. Shortly
afterwards he died.
Things in Hejaz had changed a good deal in the
elapsed month. Pursuing his former plan, Feisal had moved to Wadi Yenbo,
and was trying to make safe his rear before going up to attack the
railway in the grand manner. To relieve him of the burdensome Harb
tribes, his young half-brother Zeid was on the way up from Rabegh to
Wadi Safra, as a nominal subordinate of Sherif Ali. The advanced Harb
clans were efficiently harrying the Turkish communications between
Medina and Bir Abbas. They sent in to Feisal nearly every day a little
convoy of captured camels, or rifles picked up after an engagement, or
prisoners, or deserters.
Rabegh, shaken by the first appearance of Turkish
aeroplanes on November the seventh, had been reassured by the arrival of
a flight of four British aeroplanes, B.E. machines, under Major Ross,
who spoke Arabic so adeptly and was so splendid a leader that there
could be no two minds as to the wise direction of his help. More guns
came in week by week, till there were twenty-three, mostly obsolete, and
of fourteen patterns. Ali had about three thousand Arab infantry; of
whom two thousand were regulars in khaki, under Aziz el Masri. With them
were nine hundred camel corps, and three hundred Egyptian troops. French
gunners were promised.
Sherif Abdulla had at last left Mecca, on November
the twelfth. A fortnight later he was much where he had meant to be,
south, east, and north-east of Medina, able to cut off its supplies from
Kasim and Kuweit. Abdulla had about four thousand men with him, but only
three machine-guns, and ten inefficient mountain guns captured at Taif
and Mecca. Consequently he was not strong enough to carry out his
further plan of a concerted attack on Medina with Ali and Feisal. He
could only blockade it, and for this purpose posted himself at Henakiyeh,
a desert place, eighty miles north-east of Medina, where he was too far
away to be very useful.
The
matter of the stores in the Yenbo base was being well handled. Garland
had left the checking and issuing of them to Abd el Kader, Feisal's
governor, who was systematic and quick. His efficiency was a great
comfort to us, since it enabled us to keep our attention on more active
things. Feisal was organising his peasants, his slaves, and his paupers
into formal battalions, an irregular imitation of the new model army of
Aziz at Rabegh. Garland held bombing classes, fired guns, repaired
machine-guns, wheels, and harness, and was armourer for them all. The
feeling was busy and confident.
Feisal, who had not yet acted on our reminders of
the importance of Wejh, was imagining an expedition of the Juheina to
take it. Meanwhile he was in touch with the Billi, the numerous tribe
with headquarters in Wejh, and he hoped for support from them. Their
paramount Sheikh, Suleiman Rifada, was temporising, being really
hostile; for the Turks had made him Pasha and decorated him; but his
cousin Hamid was in arms for the Sherif, and had just captured a
gratifying little caravan of seventy camels on the way from El Ula, with
stores for the Turkish garrison of Wejh. As I was starting for Kheif
Hussein to press the Wejh plan again on Feisal, news came in of a
Turkish repulse near Bir ibn Hassani. A reconnaissance of their cavalry
and camel corps had been pushed too far into the hills, and the Arabs
had caught it and scattered it. Better and better yet.